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Why delegate monetary policy to a committee? A wide-ranging
survey undertaken by Fry et al. (1999) found that seventy-nine cen-
tral banks out of a sample of eighty-eight use some form of committee
structure when setting monetary policy. So by weight of numbers,
it appears that setting interest rates by committee is thought to be
superior. And the intuitive argument that committees make better
decisions than individuals—because they allow decision makers to
pool judgment—also seems plausible.
With the exception of Gerlach-Kristen (2001) and Sibert (2003),
the theoretical economics literature does not have much to say about
the consequences of delegating responsibility to a committee. The
hypothesis that groups make better monetary policy decisions is
diﬃcult to test, due to a lack of comparable empirical data. This
problem motivated Blinder and Morgan (2000) to adopt a diﬀerent
approach: carrying out a “laboratory experiment” on a large sample
of Princeton University students to test whether groups do indeed
make monetary policy decisions diﬀerently.
In an experiment, the researcher can isolate the relative perfor-
mance of individual and group behavior, controlling for diﬀerences in
the abilities, incentives, and preferences of the decision makers, and
of the environment in which they work. The main drawback is that
it is artiﬁcial—it is not possible to replicate exactly the complexities
of real world policymaking in the context of a simple experiment.
Psychologists have studied group behavior for many years. A se-
ries of experiments conducted by Stoner (1961) and Myers (1982)
suggested that a group should not be expected to replicate the av-
erage of the individuals who compose it. Groups often polarize the
initial tendency because participants are more likely to generate ar-
guments in favor of the position initially favored by the majority of
group members. And because of an innate desire to compare them-
selves favorably with their peers, individuals may often take increas-
ingly extreme positions in favor of the group proposition, leading to
what Stoner called a “risky shift.”
Janis’ (1972) study of U.S. foreign policymaking also found that
where groups were highly cohesive and dominated by a strong leader,
it was possible to make decisions that the majority did not agree
with, especially when operating under time pressure. The best way
to avoid this was by a frank and open exchange of views at the
beginning of the meeting. Hall’s (1971) experiments also supported
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this hypothesis, ﬁnding that for complex tasks, the best performing
groups were often those who were least consensual in the early stages
of discussion.
But overall, the evidence suggests that, provided that groups
do not reach decisions too easily or too quickly, their performance
should be at least as good as the average of their individual members.
This hypothesis was supported by the Blinder and Morgan (2000)
experiment, where committees made substantially better decisions
than individuals, although, contrary to expectations, groups were
not more inertial.
This paper describes a new experiment using students from the
London School of Economics (LSE). Like Blinder and Morgan (2000),
we ﬁnd that committees make better decisions than individuals, but
we try to explore in more detail why this is the case. Our experi-
ment suggests that committees do more than just eliminate the poor
decisions of a minority of members, also allowing members to learn
by observing the behavior of others. The experiment also explicitly
tested whether the ability to exchange information through discus-
sion improved performance; perhaps surprisingly, it did not.
Another question is, why do committee members’ votes diﬀer?
One possibility could be that participants came to the experiment
with diﬀerent prior beliefs about the nature of the (unknown) model
of the economy. So we designed a questionnaire to help establish these
“priors,” and asked participants to complete the same questionnaire
again at the end of the experiment, in order to see how much they
had learned about the model they were using.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1 describes
the economic model used, the structure of the experiment, how the
priors questionnaire was used, the information ﬂows and incentives
facing players, and the data set. Section 2 discusses the results on
learning over time, about both the model and how to play the game.
Section 3 describes the scores in the individual and committee games
and tries to explore why committee play was superior—including a
discussion of why the ability to discuss did not improve committee
performance. Section 4 looks at the relationship between activism
and committee performance. Section 5 concludes.
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1. The Experiment
1.1 The Model
We asked participants to act as monetary policymakers by attempt-
ing to “control” a simple macroeconomic model subject to shocks.
We used a standard small-scale macro model of the type widely
used for policy analysis in modern macroeconomics (see, e.g., Fuhrer
and Moore 1995) and similar to that in Blinder and Morgan (2000).
Where possible, it is calibrated to match U.K. macroeconomic data
(see Bank of England 2000) and is shown in equations (1) and (2)
below:
yt − y∗ = 0.8(yt−1 − y∗)− 0.5(Rt − πt − r∗) + g¯ + ηt (1)
πt = 0.7πt−1 + 0.3πt−2 + 0.2(yt − y∗) + νt (2)
where yt is log output; y∗ is the natural level of output, arbitrarily
calibrated to 5; πt is inﬂation; Rt is the nominal interest rate; and r∗
is the neutral real interest rate (calibrated to 3 percent per annum).
In equation (2) the coeﬃcients on lagged inﬂation sum to one, imply-
ing that although a short-run trade-oﬀ between output and inﬂation
exists, the Phillips curve is vertical in the long run.
Equation (1) is subject to two types of shock. The ﬁrst, g¯, which
can be thought of as a permanent change in the equilibrium real
interest rate, takes the value +/−0.5 and occurs once, and with equal
likelihood, in any one of the ﬁrst ﬁve periods in each round. This type
of shock is attractive because it does not aﬀect the inﬂation-output
trade-oﬀ and therefore the ability of the score function outlined in
equation (4) below to capture participants’ performance adequately.
Both the second shock in equation (1)—ηt—and νt in equation (2)
are white noise, corresponding to a random draw from a normal
distribution ∼N(0, 0.01) in each period.
The monetary authority’s decision rule for the short-term interest
rate—as decided by the participants of the experiment—closes the
model.
1.2 Priors
An intriguing feature of Blinder and Morgan’s (2000) results was
that committee members frequently disagreed about their decisions,
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despite having identical loss functions and the same information set.
But even without observing such diﬀerences in voting—whether ex-
perimentally or in real life—it seems entirely plausible that commit-
tee members can think diﬀerently about how to respond to shocks
that are only indirectly observed via the response of the endogenous
variables. This may be especially true of a committee where members
have diverse backgrounds and specialties.
We posit that the diﬀerences of opinion observed in the Blin-
der and Morgan experiment reﬂected diﬀerent subjective judgments
about the structure of the (unknown) model. So at the beginning of
our experiment, we asked the players to ﬁll in a questionnaire that
attempted to reveal their priors (see appendix 2 for details). A set of
“correct” answers to this priors questionnaire would yield both the
parameters of the underlying model and the structure of the optimal
rule.
During the experiment, players should learn about the structure
of the economy—just like real world policymakers—by observing the
response of inﬂation and output to changes in interest rates, updating
their priors, and changing their perception of the “correct” model
accordingly. We attempted to capture the extent of this learning by
asking participants to ﬁll in the same questionnaire again at the end,
in light of what they had learned during the experiment.
One way to calibrate the extent of learning is to compare both the
“before” and “after” questionnaire responses with the parameters of
the underlying model and the associated optimal rule. However, in
our experiment, the optimal rule for the real interest rate, rt, does
not correspond to a continuous function. So instead, we calculated
an approximation to the optimal rule, under full information and
the assumption that the scoring function (see equation [4] below) is
a linear quadratic.1 This benchmark rule, derived in appendix 1, is
given by
rt = 1.6yt−1 + 0.27πt−1 + 0.115πt−2 + 2g¯. (3)
1Svensson and Woodford (2000) demonstrate that, in a backward-looking
model, under the assumption of a quadratic loss function, optimal policy under
partial information is the same as under full information because of the principal
of certainty equivalence. However, equation (3) should only be thought of as an
indicative benchmark for optimal policy setting.
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1.3 Information Flows and Incentives for Players
Players received a clear mandate at the beginning of the experiment:2
their objective was to maximize a “score” function that penalized de-
viations of output and inﬂation from their target values of 5 percent
and 2.5 percent, respectively:
Score(t) = 100− 40|Output(t)− 5| − 40|Inﬂation(t)− 2.5| (4)
As in Blinder and Morgan (2000), we chose a linear rather than
quadratic loss function so that players could easily translate their
(average) score into a ﬁnal payoﬀ. And at the end of the game, the
participants were paid in pounds according to the following (known)
formula:
Payoﬀ = 10 + Average Score/10 (5)
where the maximum payoﬀ was £20 for a perfect score and was
bounded from below at £10. In practice, most students earned
around £15–£16. We also oﬀered top prizes of £100 for the best
individual score and £100 to be shared equally among the best com-
mittee.3
Just like actual policymakers, participants did not know with cer-
tainty the exact structure of the economy, but they were told that
the representative model was linear, learnable, and broadly char-
acteristic of the U.K. economy. There was also uncertainty about
the nature of the shocks hitting the economy. Players were informed
that “. . . a structural change occurs at some point during each game.
The key to playing successfully is to identify when the change has
occurred and how best to respond to it.”
They were also told that the economy was subject to other shocks
in each period of play. In Blinder and Morgan (2000), subjects were
told the probability laws governing the occurrence of the structural
shock, but we believe that our speciﬁcation makes game play more
typical of real-world policymaking, where central bankers are un-
likely to face shocks with a known distribution or size. The relative
2A copy of the oral and written instructions can be found in the Bank of
England working paper version at www.bankofengland.co.uk.
3These bonus payments were instigated in order to try to ensure that players
had an incentive not to exchange information with future participants outside
the laboratory.
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sizes of the three shocks were calibrated after testing the model on
subjects within the Bank of England.
Some manipulation of equation (3) shows that a positive g¯ shock
corresponds to a 1 percent increase in the neutral real interest rate
to 4 percent, and vice versa for a negative shock. So, for example, if
players do not react to an upward shift in r∗, they risk accelerating
inﬂation, and the model can quickly become unstable because of
the unit root in inﬂation built into the Phillips curve. Players must
therefore extract the signal from the noise and change their behavior
accordingly in order to maximize their score.
1.4 Outline of the Experiment
To analyze the eﬀect of individual versus committee decision mak-
ing, we structured the experiment so that participants played the
game under a number of diﬀerent decision-making structures. The
sequencing of the experiment is shown in table 1.
Table 1. The Structure of the Monetary Policy Experiment
Read instructions sheet
Complete priors
questionnaire
Practice rounds No score recorded
Stage 1 (rounds 1–4) Played as individuals
Stage 2 (rounds 5–8) Played as a group (i): No discussion
(ii): With discussion
Stage 3 (rounds 9–12) Played as a group (i): With discussion
(ii): No discussion
Stage 4 (rounds 13–16) Played as individuals
Complete priors questionnaire again, using knowledge gained from
participating in experiment
Students are paid according to their average score across the four
stages
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After entering the laboratory, participants were allocated ran-
domly into groups of ﬁve; given a standard, short, oral brieﬁng; and
asked to read a set of instructions. Each player then ﬁlled in the pri-
ors questionnaire and, following that, was given about ten minutes
to practice on their own with the actual version of the game used in
the experiment before starting to play “for real.”
The experiment itself comprised four stages. Each stage consisted
of four rounds, with each round containing ten periods of play in
which participants had to decide on what interest rate to set. Players
were scored according to equation (4), with the overall score for each
round being the average across the ten periods.
In the ﬁrst stage, the participants acted as individual policymak-
ers, playing separate games on separate computers for four rounds.
Each experiment began at round 1, period t = 1, with inﬂation and
output near the steady-state equilibrium (y = 5, π = 2.5).4 In each
period, inﬂation and output were observed with a one-period lag, and
participants would then decide on the appropriate level of interest
rates and enter this into the computer. The game then proceeded to
the next period (t = 2). The computer displayed output and inﬂation
outturns for period 1, the score for that period, the cumulative score
so far, and the previous interest-rate decision(s). The same decision
problem was repeated until the game reached t = 10. At this point,
players were told their average score for round 1, the game was reset,
and play continued, being repeated for another three rounds.
In stage 2—beginning in round 5—the group acted as a com-
mittee, with each member entering his or her own vote on their
computer as before. But this time, in each period, the computer cal-
culated and then implemented the group’s median vote—as a proxy
for a majority-voting rule5—and participants observed this commit-
tee decision, as well as the response of output and inﬂation to it.
They also saw the (unattributed) votes of their fellow committee
members and the committee score for the period and the round so
4The ﬁrst observation at time t = 0 would always be the steady state per-
turbed by a random shock to each equation of the model.
5Not all monetary policy committees make interest rate decisions in this way.
But in practical terms, one appealing feature of our rule is its ease of implemen-
tation during the “no discussion” committee stages, when an alternative rule,
such as unanimity, would be diﬃcult to implement.
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far. Again, each round lasted for ten periods, and stage 2 ﬁnished at
the end of round 8.
The committee phase was played over two stages—stage 2 and 3
as shown in table 1 above—each of which corresponded to a distinct
scenario. The order of these two stages was randomized across com-
mittees in order to control for learning. Under scenario (i), discussion
among members of the committee was not allowed in stage 2. The
ﬁve players observed the same information in each period—the level
of output and inﬂation of the previous period(s) as well as the history
of interest rate decisions and scores—and entered their votes while
sitting at separate computers, without talking to their fellow players.
Participants were then allowed to discuss their decisions in stage 3,
and again, the computer would set the median interest rate of the
group.6 This discussion was not constrained, and in practice could
take many forms. Under scenario (ii), stages 2 and 3 were reversed.
Stage 4 (rounds 13–16) served as another control, to ensure that
the comparison between individual and committee play was not bi-
ased by the fact that participants had had four (or more) individual
rounds to learn before entering the committee stage. By returning
to individual play at the end of the experiment, it was possible to
verify that not all of the improvement in scores during the committee
stages (rounds 5–12) was an extension of the learning trend observed
in rounds 1–4.
When the experiment was over, participants were asked to ﬁll in
the questionnaire again in light of what they had learned about the
economy from playing the game.7 Each experiment lasted between
90 and 150 minutes.
1.5 The Data
The experiment was conducted on ten evenings between November
12 and December 11, 2001. Participation in the experiment was vol-
untary. The sample was independent of the authors: participants
were students at the London School of Economics. A total of 170
6Participants were again asked to sit at their own computers to enter their
votes: during testing we observed that if the committee gathered around one
computer, this created a bias towards the decision of a chairperson who entered
the votes.
7The wording at the beginning of the priors questionnaire was changed to
reﬂect this focus.
190 International Journal of Central Banking May 2005
students participated in thirty-four independent experiments,8 giv-
ing a cross-section of thirty-four committees with sixteen time series
observations for each. All participating students had taken at least
one undergraduate-level economics course.
2. Learning Results
The main focus of the experiment was to provide evidence on the
diﬀerences between group and individual policymaking; this is dis-
cussed in section 3 below. But because the nature of the experiment
is one of decision making under uncertainty, we begin by discussing
the results on learning about both the model and how to play the
game.
2.1 Learning About the Model
Players’ answers to the priors questionnaire give some insight into
their initial beliefs about the structure of the economy. Participants
were also asked to ﬁll in the questionnaire again at the end in light of
what they had learned during the experiment, and from this we can
judge whether their beliefs had converged on the actual parameters
of the underlying model. Summary statistics for the questionnaire
responses are shown in table 2.
For all questions apart from question 1 (Q1), the dispersion of
responses to the ﬁnal questionnaire is lower, although this decline is
not signiﬁcant. For each question, more than half of the participants
improved in the ﬁnal questionnaire.
The mean square error (MSE) of responses for each individual
question was also calculated with reference to the underlying model
and benchmark rule. We can use paired sample tests to examine the
changes in players’ responses after participating in the experiment.
Across all questions, the MSE of responses fell from 0.17 in the initial
questionnaire to 0.15 at the end of the experiment, which is signiﬁ-
cant at the 1 percent level (t = 3.4). We can also examine whether
this learning is concentrated on certain aspects of the model.
The biggest improvements were in answers to Q2 and Q3.
This shows that participants learned most about the lags in the
8No student was allowed to play the game more than once.
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transmission mechanism of monetary policy (Q2) and the weight
they should attach to deviations of output from trend in their rule
(Q3). The responses to Q5, which considers the responsiveness of
output to interest rate changes, are interesting: this is the only ques-
tion where responses got signiﬁcantly worse. On average, players
started the experiment with surprisingly accurate beliefs about this
parameter, but after playing the game they believed that output was
more sensitive to interest rate changes than it actually is. There are
several reasons why this might be the case: ﬁrst, the short-run pol-
icy multiplier is larger for output than inﬂation, and second, output
responds much more to the structural shock in the short run than
inﬂation.
For the other ﬁve questions, beliefs changed by much less, and
t-tests show that the changes in means are not signiﬁcant. Partic-
ipants did not learn much, if anything, about the appropriate de-
gree of interest rate smoothing and the parameters of the model
(Q1 and Q4–Q8, respectively). But this may not be too surprising:
although participants played the game a number of times, each indi-
vidual round lasted only ten periods and may have been too short for
players to deduce much about the long-run properties of the model.
We cross-checked these results with Wilcoxon signed rank tests,
which support the conclusions of the t-tests and are also reported in
table 2.
Which players learned most? There is a positive and signiﬁ-
cant (at the 1 percent level, t = 10.7) correlation between play-
ers whose MSE was largest at the beginning and those who learned
most about the parameters of the model. There is also a positive
and signiﬁcant (at the 1 percent level, t = 3.66) correlation be-
tween the fall in the MSE of responses to the priors questionnaire
and performance in rounds 13–16. So those who learned most about
the model during the game—whether through their own experience
or by playing with others—did better in the ﬁnal set of individual
rounds.
2.2 Learning About Playing the Game
Did players actually get better at playing the game over time? The
solid line in ﬁgure 1 shows the mean score attained by the 170 indi-
viduals in each of rounds 1–4 and 13–16, and the mean score achieved
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Figure 1. Scores for Players Over Time
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by the thirty-four committees during rounds 5–12.9 There are three
striking features:
1. the signiﬁcant upward trend in the results over time
2. the large rise in scores when players moved to committee decision
making
3. the large downward move in scores when participants returned to
playing as individuals
Individuals’ scores were higher in round 16 than in round 1: the
mean score rose from 23 to 53. This increase is signiﬁcant at the 1
percent level (t = 5.12), providing evidence of a signiﬁcant learning
eﬀect during the game.
Within the individual rounds, there was also some evidence of
learning. The average individual score was twelve points higher in
round 4 than in round 1 and was eight points higher in round
16 than in round 13. Both diﬀerences in mean tests are signiﬁ-
cant at the 1 percent level for a one-tailed test (t = 2.38 and
9It is not possible to calculate an individual score for each person in the
committee rounds, as the evolution of the round and therefore the score are
determined by the decision of the committee as a whole.
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t = 2.61). These results suggest that it is possible to get better
at playing the game, even when not exchanging information with
others.10
If we rank the players in each committee by their initial per-
formance, we ﬁnd—perhaps unsurprisingly—that the worst players
improved most. Although even the best players in each committee
improved somewhat, the improvement in scores was only signiﬁcant
for the worst two players in each committee. This is consistent with
the view that some players begin the game with a totally incorrect
model in their head, and so their decisions attract a very low score
initially relative to others with more accurate priors. As they learn
that their priors do not accord with the truth—through playing the
game and observing their scores—they update their beliefs and their
performance improves accordingly.
These ﬁndings contrast with those of Blinder and Morgan (2000),
where there was less evidence of learning. One reason for this might
be that our model is slightly simpler. For example, participants have
to learn fewer parameters in our game: ﬁve as compared with seven
in the Blinder and Morgan experiment.
3. Groups Versus Individuals
We found strong evidence that decisions made by committees were
superior to those made by individuals. The average score during
the committee rounds was nearly two-thirds better (68 compared
with 41), and signiﬁcantly higher (t = 7.4) than the average for the
individual rounds.
We can also use our benchmark rule to calibrate the size of this
improvement. The average score from simulating the game under this
rule was 85, much higher than the best individual player’s score (71),
but only slightly better than the best committee (83). On average,
moving from individual decision making to a committee structure
closed nearly two-thirds of this “policy gap.”
10Because we use a “within subject” rather than a “between subject” experi-
mental design, it is diﬃcult to draw ﬁrm conclusions about how much learning
in rounds 13–16 is related to earlier group feedback. However, the upward trend
over the ﬁnal four individual rounds is consistent with at least some learning
being related to individual play.
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3.1 Explaining the Improvement
How do we explain the improvement in performance of committees
over individuals? There are (at least) two distinct, competing
hypotheses that can be used to explain why committee decisions
are superior:
Hypothesis 1: A committee with majority voting can neutralize the
impact of some members playing badly in any given game.
Hypothesis 2: Committees allow members to improve performance
by sharing information and learning from each other.
We can use ﬁgure 1 to give a visual representation of the contri-
bution of these two hypotheses. We ﬁrst took the scores of the ﬁve
players in each committee during the individual rounds and calcu-
lated that of the median player (the third best performer in each
committee across all the individual rounds). So the dashed line in
ﬁgure 1 represents the mean of the median players’ scores in each
of rounds 1–4 and 13–16. The solid line is the mean score across
all 170 players in the individual rounds, and the mean score across
the thirty-four committees during each of rounds 5–12. Line C is
the mean score across rounds 5–12 taken together, and line D is
the average of the median players’ scores over rounds 13–16 taken
together.
The overall improvement in performance—generated by setting
interest rates by committee—is taken to be C – A: the diﬀerence be-
tween the mean individual score in round 4 and the mean committee
score across rounds 5–12.
Figure 1 decomposes this improvement into two distinct com-
ponents. One component is the diﬀerence between the score of the
mean and median player in the individual rounds (represented by
the distance B – A in ﬁgure 1), which should be equal to the
adverse eﬀect of a minority of poor performers on the mean in-
dividual score. This is therefore the extent of improvement un-
der hypothesis 1 described above. This portion of the diﬀerence in
means is signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level (t = 3.7), so we can-
not reject hypothesis 1. The contribution of hypothesis 2 should
be represented by the second component—the residual, or C – B
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(the portion of the committee improvement not explained by the
move to majority voting). This diﬀerence is also signiﬁcant at
the 1 percent level (t = 2.8), so we cannot reject hypothesis 2
either.
The mean committee score (68) was also higher (t = 1.51, sig-
niﬁcant at the 10 percent level) than that of the best individual
(65—calculated as the person with the highest average score across
all the individual rounds) in each committee when playing alone.
This provides further evidence that committees do more than just
replicate the behavior of their best individual.
The signiﬁcant decline in scores as participants move back to
individual play is a striking feature of both our results and those of
Blinder and Morgan (2000). By deﬁnition, this “residual” component
of the committee improvement cannot be associated with learning
about the game, because the information set of the players must be
at least as great in round 13 as it was before. We argue therefore
that at least some of this residual eﬀect stems from the ability of
committees to pool judgment, expertise, and skill. The distance C –
D in ﬁgure 1 represents the diﬀerence between the average committee
score and that of the median individual player in each committee.
At 12.9 points, it is also signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level (t = 4.2).
This evidence also supports the view that there is something special
about committees, beyond their ability to strip out the eﬀects of bad
players.
In order to try to abstract from learning eﬀects in the initial
rounds of the game, we can also compare committee scores with
those achieved by the ﬁrst, second, and third best players—as judged
by their performance in rounds 13–16 of the game. Though com-
mittees do not outperform their best player (as judged by this cri-
terion), scores are signiﬁcantly higher for all other members (for
example, for the second best player, t = 2.91, signiﬁcant at the
1 percent level) when they set monetary policy together. This is
a striking result because it suggests that even after players have
had repeated opportunities to learn about the game, and from each
other, most still perform better when they make collective deci-
sions. Furthermore, given that it may be very diﬃcult in prac-
tice to judge ex-ante who would be the best decision maker, this
result shows that on balance it is better to make decisions by
committee.
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Figure 2. Distribution of Scores Across Players
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Figure 2 shows a Tukey box-plot11 of both the scores across the
170 individual players in rounds 1–4 and 13–16 and across the thirty-
four committees in rounds 5–8. For the box-plots, the height of the
box represents the interquartile range for each round, with the po-
sition of the median score shown by the horizontal line inside the
box. The lines running vertically from the bottom and top edges of
the boxes are “whiskers,” which extend to the furthest observation
within one and a half interquartile ranges of the bottom and top of
the box. Stars mark out “minor outliers” (outside the range of the
whiskers), and dots mark “major outliers,” which lie greater than
three interquartile ranges from the bottom of the box.
Several features are immediately striking. First, the range of
scores is much wider for the individual than for the committee
rounds, both in terms of the interquartile range of the distribu-
tion and the number of outliers. Individual scores are more often
negative, and some particularly poor players achieve very low (neg-
ative) scores. For the committee games, only one outlier achieves a
negative score (of −1.8 in round 7). Second, the individual scores
11See Tukey (1977).
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show a much larger negative skew: the median is much closer to
the upper than lower quartile and there are long tails of negative
scores.
Comparing the distribution of scores between the ﬁrst and sec-
ond individual stages may also give an insight into what players
learn from being in a committee. The whole distribution is a lot
narrower in stage 4, and although there is only a moderate shift up
in the second and third quartiles, the ﬁrst quartile is much higher,
the very long tails in rounds 1–4 are absent, and the number of
outliers falls somewhat. This is consistent with the hypothesis sug-
gested above that the worst players learn a lot from being part of a
committee.
We can also examine a breakdown of the performance of an “ar-
tiﬁcial committee” over time, using the median player in each in-
dividual round as a proxy for the committee (see ﬁgure 3). Again
we see a much narrower distribution during the committee rounds—
demonstrated by the smaller boxes (the interquartile range in the
committee rounds is half the size on average) and shorter whiskers.
And although the performance improvements are greatest for the
Figure 3. Distribution of Score for “Artiﬁcial Committee”
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lower quartile, it is deﬁnitely possible to discern an upward shift in
the positions of the boxes in the ﬁgure during rounds 5–12. The ﬁrst,
second, and third quartiles increase by twenty-eight, sixteen, and ten
points, respectively.
3.2 Does Discussion Help?
The experiment also included two diﬀerent ways of organizing com-
mittee decision making: one where participants were allowed to dis-
cuss their views and another where no verbal communication was
allowed. Although the mean score of committees who were allowed
to discuss their decisions (67) was signiﬁcantly higher (t = 7.9, sig-
niﬁcant at the 1 percent level) than the mean individual score in
rounds 13–16 of the experiment (51), perhaps the most surprising
result was that the ability to discuss did not signiﬁcantly improve
committee performance.12 The mean score of committees who did
not discuss their decisions was 69, which was actually slightly (but
not signiﬁcantly, t = 1.39) higher than those committees who were
able to discuss their decisions.
So our committees must have pooled information in other ways.
The beneﬁts of diﬀerent forms of communication are likely to depend
on the nature of the game, as well as the individuals taking part.
There are many games—for example, snooker or chess—that may
be easier to learn by watching, rather than discussion.
Our results are also supportive of those from the social psychol-
ogy literature discussed above, which suggest that discussion may
not always enhance group performance. And although it appears
that for this experiment, and for this set of students, discussion did
not provide more information than could be acquired by observing
others’ votes, we cannot tell for sure how much of this result is being
driven by the particular speciﬁcation of our experiment. Real-world
policymaking is undoubtedly a much more complex aﬀair, and the
beneﬁts of discussing decisions with fellow committee members are
likely to be high.
12This contrasted with earlier trials on Bank of England staﬀ. Observation
of the LSE experiment in progress suggested that the quality of the discussion
varied across committees—some would just talk about what interest rate to set,
whereas others talked about what the structure of the model might be.
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4. Policy Activism and Performance
When the model described by equations (1) and (2) was simulated
under the benchmark rule (3), interest rate movements were, on aver-
age, signiﬁcantly less activist than those of the individuals (t = 15.0,
signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level), but not the committees (t = −7.08,
signiﬁcant at the 1 percent level), who played the game. If we calcu-
late interest rate activism as the standard deviation of the interest
rate during each ten-period round, 92 percent of individuals were
more active than the benchmark rule, whereas only 9 percent of
committees were. One interpretation might be that committees al-
low players to learn the appropriate amount of activism more quickly
by pooling information.13 In other words, they can work out that ag-
gressive movements in interest rates make the economy more diﬃcult
to control, and players understand this property of the model more
quickly by either exchanging information or watching the votes of
others.
Some supporting evidence is provided by ﬁgure 4, which
shows a signiﬁcant, negative relationship between hypothesis 2
improvement—that is, the portion of the committee improvement
not explained by the move to majority voting—and policy ac-
tivism (as measured by the standard deviation of committee interest
rate decisions over time). However, ﬁgure 4 tells us nothing about
causation.
A further test would be whether individuals are less active
in rounds 13–16 than rounds 1–4. Although the standard devia-
tion of rate changes falls slightly, the change is not signiﬁcant, so
another interpretation might be that committees naturally make
more gradual decisions. This is not formally tested in our experi-
ment, but Blinder and Morgan (2000) found that, on average, com-
mittees did not take longer to change their views than individu-
als. This was in direct contrast to what Alan Blinder expected in
light of his experience sitting on the U.S. Federal Open Market
Committee.
13Even if the causation were to run in the opposite direction—that is to say
that bad players need to vary interest rates more because the economy is further
away from target—it is still the case that good players can learn that this strategy
is suboptimal over time.
Vol. 1 No. 1 Committees Versus Individuals 201
Figure 4. Hypothesis 2 Improvement and Committee
Activism
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5. Conclusions and Suggestions for Further Work
In this paper, we have undertaken an experimental analysis of mon-
etary policy decision making by individuals and committees. An ex-
periment like this has obvious limitations: it can only be indicative
of what might happen in the real world, where policymaking is a
much more complex aﬀair. Because of the need to design a relatively
simple experiment, and the focus on testing the proposition that
committees are better than individuals, our research has nothing to
say on other aspects of optimal committee design such as committee
size, composition, or how discussion should be structured.
Our experiment does suggest overwhelmingly that committees
performed much better than the average of the individuals who
composed them. There is also evidence to suggest that committees
perform signiﬁcantly better than all but their best member, and
given that it might be diﬃcult to discern ex-ante who is the best
person, on balance it would seem advisable to make decisions by
committee.
We argue that, while some of the improvement associated with
group play reﬂects the averaging of errors across members, the ability
of committees to allow the pooling of judgment and information (in
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whatever form) also has a signiﬁcant role to play in explaining why
committees do better. Perhaps surprisingly, committees who were
able to discuss their decisions did not perform better than those
who could not. In our experiment, participants were able to glean
the same amount of information about the game from observing each
other’s play as from discussion. These results certainly merit fur-
ther investigation, perhaps using a more complicated or more lifelike
setup than ours.
It is also possible to observe some evidence of learning within the
experiment. The answers to the priors questionnaire suggest that
participants learned a signiﬁcant amount about certain aspects of
the model during the game, although the experiment may not have
been long enough for participants to learn much about the structural
parameters. In addition, the distribution of scores across players nar-
rowed during the course of the game—with the worst players learning
most.
Appendix 1. Derivation of the Benchmark Rule
Assuming that players attempt to maximize their score (St) in each
period of the game, the decision problem can be written as
Max
rt
Et−1{St} s.t. (1) yt = 0.8yt−1 − 0.5rt + g¯ + ηt
where ηt ∼ N(0, σ2η)
(2) πt = 0.7πt−1 + 0.3πt−2 + 0.2yt + νt
where νt ∼ N(0, σ2v)
where (3) St = 100− 40|yt − y∗| − 40|πt − π∗|
Equations (1) and (2) are written in deviation from equilibrium
form, and rt is the real interest rate.
Approximating (3) as a linear quadratic, we derive the bench-
mark rule by substituting in the constraints (1) and (2) and diﬀer-
entiating with respect to rt, to give
rt = 1.6yt−1 + 0.27πt−1 + 0.115πt−2 + 2g¯ (4)
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Obviously, the distribution of g¯ is unknown to participants in the
experiment, so (4) is the “certainty equivalence benchmark rule.” If
our loss function were quadratic, the optimal policy rule under par-
tial information would be the same as its full-information counter-
part, according to Svensson and Woodford (2000).
We use this benchmark rule to conduct the simulations in section
3 and also to calibrate the responses to the “before” and “after”
priors questionnaires.
Appendix 2. Priors Questionnaire
Players were asked to give numeric responses to the following
questions. They could choose any value from α = 0 to α = 1, with
intervals of 0.1, apart from question (2), where the options ranged
from zero to ten periods. Although all players would have taken at
least one university-level macroeconomics course, it is likely they
may not have been familiar with the type of model used for the
experiment, or the “correct” calibration of the parameter values
in the questions below. Participants were told that if they did not
understand the jargon in brackets, they should instead make a guess
governed by how much they agreed or disagreed with the statement
in the question.14
(1) To what extent should monetary policymakers respond cau-
tiously to shocks (i.e., if their interest rate reaction function includes
the expression it = αit−1 + . . . . , what weight should they place on
α)?
(2) After how many quarters is the maximum impact of monetary
policy on inﬂation felt?
(3) What relative weight should monetary policymakers place
on smoothing output compared with controlling inﬂation (i.e.,
if their reaction function includes the expression it = α(yt − Y )
+(1− α)(πt − π∗) + . . . . , what weight should they place on α)?
14A complete copy of the questionnaire can be found in the Bank of England
working paper version at www.bankofengland.co.uk.
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(4) To what extent are shocks to output persistent (i.e., if the
expression for output included the term yt = αyt−1 + . . . . , what
weight do you think α would take)?
(5) How sensitive is output to changes in interest rates (i.e., if the
expression for output included the term yt = αit + . . . . , what weight
do you think α would take)?
(6) To what extent are shocks to inﬂation persistent (i.e., if the
expression for inﬂation included the term πt = απt−1 + . . . . , what
weight do you think α would take)?
(7) To what extent is inﬂation sensitive to deviations of output from
trend in the short run (i.e., if the expression for inﬂation included
the term πt = α(yt−1−Y )+ . . . . , what weight do you think α would
take)?
(8) To what extent is inﬂation sensitive to deviations of output from
trend in the long run? Not at all sensitive (i.e., α = 0) or highly
sensitive (i.e., α = 1)?
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